Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch – Ninth Circuit Holds that Joyriding (CA VC 10851(a)) is not a CIMT

On December 28, 2015, the Ninth Circuit decided Almanza-Arenas v . Lynch.

The en banc court granted Gabriel Almanza-Arenas’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ published precedential decision, Matter of Almanza-Arenas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 771 (BIA 2009), which held that a conviction for vehicle theft under California Vehicle Code § 10851(a) constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. Applying Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), the en banc court first held that § 10851(a) is overbroad and not a categorical match to the federal offense because it punishes conduct that both is and is not a crime of moral turpitude (CIMT). The en banc court next held that § 10851(a) is an indivisible statute because the intent element requires intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive an owner of their vehicle, thus criminalizing conduct that ALMANZA-ARENAS V. LYNCH 3 both would and would not constitute a CIMT. While recognizing a circuit split as to whether, following Descamps, courts may look to state law to determine a statute’s elements, the en banc court found that § 10851(a) is indivisible because under California law the two forms of intent are alternative means of accomplishing the same crime rather than two separate crimes. Concurring, Judge Owens wrote that he joined the majority opinion because it correctly followed this court’s precedent, but that he would find that the precedent is incorrect. Concurring in the judgment, Judge Watford agreed that a conviction under § 10851(a) is not a CIMT, but disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the statute is indivisible. Judge Watford wrote that he would overrule Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014), because its divisibility analysis is inconsistent with Descamps’ approach.

The full text of the decision can be read here: http://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/09-71415/09-71415-2015-12-28.pdf?ts=1451325757