People v. Arredondo – DUI – Sixth District holds that implied consent law does not authorize warrantless blood draws

On February 26, 2016, the Sixth District decided an appeal that originated in Santa Clara County.  Defendant drove away from a gathering at which he and his passengers had been drinking. A passenger testified that after visiting a liquor store, defendant began to “drive crazy,” ultimately causing the vehicle to flip. Three passengers fled the scene. Two others were injured, one with a brain injury. Defendant was taken to Santa Clara Medical Center where he was arrested.

A blood sample was drawn, while defendant was unconscious, disclosing a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent. Defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, causing injury; felony driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent, causing injury; and misdemeanor driving without a license. Several enhancements were charged because of the passengers’ bodily injuries. The court denied a motion to suppress, finding that blood extraction was permissible, without a warrant or a showing of exigent circumstances, under California’s “implied consent” law, which declares that one who drives a motor vehicle is “deemed” to consent to blood alcohol testing. The court of appeal affirmed. While the consent imputed to drivers under that law cannot alone justify a seizure without a duly issued warrant, the officer reasonably relied on the statute, bringing the case within the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.

The court at one point writes:

“If imputed consent is to be held sufficient to sustain a warrantless search, the holding will have to come from a court other than this one. We fear the Fourth Amendment could be left in tatters by a rule empowering the state to predicate a search on conduct that does not in fact constitute a manifestation of consent but is merely “deemed” to do so by legislative fiat. It is far from implausible, for example, that a legislative body—state or federal—might decree, in the name of public safety or national security, that the use of the mails, or the phone lines, or the internet—all of which rely to a greater or lesser extent on publicly owned property or facilities or publicly provided services—constitutes consent to search the contents of all communications thus conducted. Consent to search homes might be “deemed” to be given by anyone taking advantage of various publicly provided or subsidized privileges—like use of public utilities, libraries, or schools. Consent to search the person might be “deemed” to be given by use of a public sidewalk or occupancy of a public place.”

Though the “good faith exception” applied in this case, it should not in the future.  The case is key because it explicitly holds that California’s impiled consent laws cannot abrogate the 4th Amendment’s protections.